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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is the driving force in the economic success of countries.
Many empirical studies suggest that the measured rate of entrepreneurship
relative to the total labor force of an economy typically falls within, say 6-10
per cent.1 Abstracting from self-employment, the rate of entrepreneurship
proper (those who employ workers) is much smaller. To develop policies to-
wards entrepreneurship, it is important to identify the barriers in the market
for entrepreneurship to alleviate the effects of those distortions. The current
paper discusses several of those mechanisms. A model of occupational choice
is developed to cope with a number of issues.
Earlier papers have pointed to entry costs or taxes in shaping the mar-
ket entry of start-up firms. The work on entry-related regulatory costs by
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2001), in particular, sug-
gests that these costs are empirically significant.2 Our paper qualifies the
role of entry costs. This is one of the topics addressed. We suggest that peo-
ple differ substantially in terms of their ability to produce a business idea,
elaborate their idea and make its way to a marketable product or service.
From the perspective of the public finance theory, such costs represent innate
social costs which do not necessarily justify policy interventions. However,
the entry costs caused by, say excessive governmental regulation, do.3 The
second distortion addressed by our paper arises from labor markets where
rent-seeking unions defend the interests of special groups with their bargain-
ing power on wages. Such behavior raises the opportunity cost of entry for
a potential entrepreneur. It also has an impact on the firm’s labor demand
and hence the size distribution of firms. Both effects interfere with the for-
1Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001).
2The estimated entry cost, including the number of procedures on safety and health,
environment, taxes, labor, screening and the monetized value of the entrepreneurs’ time
is low in Canada and the USA, i.e., 2.3 and 1.7 per cent relative to GDP per capita. It is
much higher in the European economies, 32.5 per cent in Germany and 44.8 per cent in
Italy, for example. In Ireland, the entry cost is lower than in the continental Europe, 18.9
per cent, which has led to substantial gains in enterprise formation. Some care is needed
in the interpretation of data. For example, while in the high-entry-regulation Italy, the
entry cost is relatively high, the rate of measured entrepreneurship is also high because
of the high rate of self-employment. Moreover, firms start out larger when young in Italy,
but grow more slowly (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006)).
3This argument is based on the empirical observations that some countries have been
much more successful than others in economizing on those costs cf. Djankov et al. (2002).
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mation of entrepreneurship in an economy.4 Finally, the life of a business
idea may be much longer than is the working life. Retiring entrepreneurs
seek successors. From the social point of view, the efficient transmission of
the tacit knowledge accumulated by an active entrepreneur would be highly
desirable. Frictions in the market for firms and the risk of winner’s curse cre-
ate informational barriers. The successors cannot judge the value of the tacit
knowledge available. We introduce an analysis of overlapping generations of
entrepreneurs which, we think, is new.
The influential proposition by De Meza and Webb (1987, 1999), elabo-
rated subsequently by Boadway and Keen (2006), suggests that the social
value of the marginal entrepreneur when financed from outside sources is
negative. The policy implication is fierce: a tax on start-up entrepreneurs
increases welfare. The proposition has been gained additional support from
the paper by Coelho, De Meza and Reyniers (2004) who claim that people
in general and entrepreneurs in particular are overly optimistic. The policy
implication of this latter view is even more dramatic: a tax on entrepre-
neurs enhances not only the social welfare but also the private welfare of
the marginal entrepreneur. Our claim is that these papers have focused just
on one or two distortions, that arising from informational asymmetry in the
credit markets or excessive optimism. They have, however, abstracted from
other equally (or even more) relevant distortions to be discussed in the cur-
rent paper.5 For example, the De Meza - Webb proposition was formulated
for self-employed entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs employing outside labor will
bear - jointly with those becoming unemployed - the burden created by the
labor market distortions.
We noticed above that there is a real problem of how to measure empiri-
cally entrepreneurship. The data is also convincing that self-employment is
the strongest in developing countries. Due to high entry costs and hence non-
existing firms, people become self-employed "entrepreneurs" to make their
living. In industrialized economies with high unemployment, there is push
towards entrepreneurship, particularly in the peripheral areas with high un-
4Kanniainen and Leppämäki (2005) suggest that union wage policies enhance the en-
trepreneurial risk, discouraging entry. Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) suggest that various
labor protection measures have the same effect. Such conclusions obtain indirect support
from the European experience where the development of entrepreneurship has been quite
disappointing for quite some time.
5Recently, Puri and Robinson (2006) using the data in Survey of Consumer Finance
have downplayed the proposition of excessive optimism of entrepreneurs.
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employment and few firms. A tax proposed by the De Meza - Webb model
on those self-employed "entrepreneurs" would be devastating.
Our paper introduces a unified and technically easy model to analyze the
stated issues. The framework is flexible and we extend it in several directions.
Some additional extensions are included as concluding remarks in the final
section.6
2 Entrepreneurship and Labor Markets
2.1 Competitive Labor Markets
In our model, the economy is assumed to consist of a continuum of one-period
lived individuals with mass one. All capital is entrepreneurial capital. There
is no physical capital.7 Each individual can either become a worker or an en-
trepreneur who employs some workers. We do not consider the self-employed.
In the technology considered, both an entrepreneur and a worker are neces-
sary inputs. Entrepreneurs create the jobs and manage them. Workers make
firms productive. All people are alike by their productivity as workers but
they differ in terms of their entrepreneurial skills.8 It is convenient to dif-
ferentiate people according to their entry costs (ability) as entrepreneurs. In
particular, setting up an enterprise involves fixed start-up costs of two types.
The first type, ci, is individual-specific and unobservable. It is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, c] . High-ability entrepreneurs face a lower entry cost than
the low-ability ones. The second type, ĉ, arises from government regulation.
Both become sunk. Demand is perfectly elastic at price p.
6The effects of entrepreneurial, capital and labor taxes on entry of start-up firms have
been analyzed in Kanniainen, Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2007). We largely abstract from
taxes in the current paper. We point, however, that the innate entry costs are largely
unobservable and hence do not qualify as deductible expenses in the income tax base of
an entrepreneur. This raises the effective income tax on a start-up firm. There is some
research on the effects of redistributive taxation on occupational choices. Boadway et
al. (1991) analyze a discrete occupational choice between a risky and a safe occupation,
where citizens differ ex ante. Poutvaara (2002) analyzes the effects of taxation on a choice
between several risky occupations, deriving the conditions under which redistributive tax-
ation encourages risk-taking.
7Our model is basically an extension of Kanbur (1979) to incorporate the entry cost.
The model can easily be extended to include productive capital.
8This important distinction has been conventional since Lucas (1978).
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Occupational choice. We assume that the utilities are linear in income,
labor markets are competitive and there is thus one wage rate. In the basic
model, there is no entrepreneurial risk.9 Entrepreneurs hire workers who
provide a unit input at the market wage and produce the output. Each worker
produces one unit of output. Additional labor hires lead to increasing costs.
Thus, the technology has a "U-shaped" average cost curve. Entrepreneurs
earn the residual profit. It is convenient to model the technology and the
resulting profit of entrepreneur i as
πi = −(ĉ+ ci) + pl − wl − w
1
2
l2. (1)
The labor demand (size) of each firm, l(w), is solved from max
l
πi as
l =
p− w
w
. (2)
Let v denote the size of the entrepreneurial class. Labor market equilibrium
1− v = vl (3)
then determines the market-clearing wage. To solve for it, insert l = p−w
w
to
obtain the solution for the wage, w(v), in terms of the size of the entrepre-
neurial class, v
w = vp. (4)
Thus, firm size (labor demand) becomes
l =
1− v
v
. (5)
The marginal entrepreneur, m, is just indifferent between setting up an en-
terprise and entering as a worker,
−(ĉ+ cm) + pl − wl − w
1
2
l2 = w. (6)
This condition will be repeatedly used in the current paper.
From the distribution of the start-up costs, the marginal entrepreneur’s
cost is given by
cm = vc. (7)
9We introduce the failure risk below.
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Thus, inserting w and l, we re-write the indifference condition of the marginal
entrepreneur as
−(ĉ+ vc) + p
1− v
v
− vp
1− v
v
− vp
1
2
(
1− v
v
)2
− vp = 0.
This simplifies to a second-order equation in v, the size of the entrepre-
neurial class,
v2 [(2/p) c+ 1] + [(2/p) ĉ+ 2] v − 1 = 0. (8)
Solving, we obtain
Proposition 1 The size of the entrepreneurial class is determined by
v =
√
[(1/p) ĉ+ 1]2 + [(2/p) c+ 1]− [(1/p) ĉ+ 1]
[(2/p) c+ 1]
. (9)
Because ∂ν/∂c < 0, ∂ν/∂ĉ < 0, both entry costs operate like a tax entrepre-
neurship.
The government’s failure to economize on the bureaucratic costs and other
consequences of excessive regulation results in reduced enterprise formation.10
Having stated this conclusion and to economize on notations, we simplify the
formal model making ĉ = 0. Then we have
v =
√
1 + [(2/p) c+ 1]− 1
[(2/p) c+ 1]
.
Entrepreneurial risk So far we have abstracted from the failure risk of
an entrepreneur. We now introduce the risk.11 Denoting θ = the probability
10This problem is serious particularly in many developing countries with wide corrup-
tion.
11The failure rate of new enterprises indeed is substantial. A German study suggested
that 24 per cent of German start-up firms were closed down within the first two years and
37 per cent within the five first years (Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1992)). In the
UK, 45 per cent of new start-up firms were closed down within the first two and a half
years and 80 per cent within six years (Cressy, 1996, 2006). In Portugal, 20 per cent of
new firms fell within the first year and 50 per cent within the first four years (Mata and
Portugal (1994)).
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of success and 1− θ = the probability of failure, the expected profit is stated
as
πi = −ci + θpl − wl − w
1
2
l2.
The entrepreneur faces an unlimited liability. With the failure risk intro-
duced, the size of the entrepreneurial class is determined by
v =
√
1 + [(2/θp) c+ 1]− 1
[(2/θp) c+ 1]
. (10)
The natural conclusion follows that reduced failure risk (increase in θ)
increases the size of the entrepreneurial class, ∂v/∂θ > 0; the marginal en-
trepreneur can afford to incur a smaller cost of entry. Having stated this
result, we resume back to the basic model where θ = 1.
Incidence. To study the incidence of entry cost, recall that the equilibrium
market wage is given by w = vp. Thus, ∂w/∂c = p∂v/∂c < 0. Therefore, as
the entry cost reduces entrepreneurship, its effect is capitalized in the market
wage w = vp.
Corollary 1. The entry cost of entrepreneurs is capitalized in the market
wage of workers.
Another consequence, however, is that the size of each enterprise is bigger
when the entry cost is high, as ∂l/∂v = ∂
(
1−v
v
)
/∂v < 0.12
It is typical to argue in our profession that wages are linked to productiv-
ity. We do not challenge this proposition but we provide a complementary
angle: wages are low because the entry costs as an entrepreneur are high for
most people.
The (first-best) social welfare (total income) is given by the value-added
(wages + profits)
W = vue + (1− v)uw = vπ + (1− v)w. (11)
The social value of an entrepreneur is measured by the profit he is gen-
erating. However, this measure should not obscure the mechanism that by
setting up a firm which employs workers, the workers employed have access
to positive inframarginal benefits measured by the cost saving as they need
12We notice that our model thus confirms what the data suggested of the high-entry-
regulation Italian case above.
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not enter as entrepreneurs. Someone else is employing them (and taking the
risk). The entrepreneurs are compensated for their social contribution in
terms of their profit. Entrepreneurs with low entry costs earn positive rents.
In equilibrium, the marginal entrepreneur’s utility equals that of the workers.
3 Labor Unions
We next consider the case where the assumption of a competitive labor mar-
ket is replaced by the assumption that the wage rate is determined by a union.
The union solution results in a market wage which exceeds the competitive
wage derived above13,
w > w. (12)
In Europe, unions are typically industry-wide and sometimes the wage ne-
gotiations determine the wage development also at the national level.14 As
workers have the same productivity, there is no role for differentiated wages.
Instead, the union chooses the wage rate to maximize its objective function.15
At a higher wage, each enterprise employs less workers as l′(w) < 0 and
labor demand is
l =
p− w
w
.
Labor market equilibrium is distorted away from the competitive equilib-
rium. If there are n unemployed workers, the number of employed workers
vl satisfies
1− v − n = vl,
or
n = 1− v(1 + l). (13)
Inserting 1 + l = p
w
, unemployment is determined as
n = 1− v
p
w
.
13Cf. Oswald (1985) and Farber (1986).
14France is an example of country where the formal union coverage among workers is
limited but where the union wages are yet largely adopted in the economy. In the high
union density countries like Finland and Sweden, the wage negotiations have often been
nationwide.
15Consequently, the unemployment rate tends to higher in a unionized economy when
compared with economies with a more limited union power, ch. Nickel (1997). This creates
an interest conflict - known as an insider/outsider conflict - between the employed workers
and those who end up collecting unemployment compensation.
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The greater w is, the greater is unemployment.
What about the entry condition of a start-up entrepreneur in a unionized
economy? For the marginal worker among those who have the option of
being employed by some entrepreneur, the entry condition is16
−cmu + pl − wl − w
1
2
l2 = w.
We have denoted the entry cost of the marginal entrepreneur in a union-
ized economy by cmu . It must be lower than in the case of a competitive labor
market, cmu < c
m.
Introducing l = p−w
w
,
−cmu + p
(
p− w
w
)
− w
(
p− w
w
)
− w
1
2
(
p− w
w
)2
− w = 0,
or
−cmu +
1
2
(p− w)2
(
1
w
)
− w = 0.
Insert cmu = vuc, where vu < v denotes the entrepreneurship in the unionized
economy, we can solve
vu =
(p− w)2 − 2w2
2cw
. (14)
We state
Proposition 2 Union wage setting reduces entrepreneurship, making the
size of the entrepreneurial class deviate from its first-best level.17
The condition vu < v is satisfied when it holds that
vu =
(p− w)2 − 2w2
2cw
< v =
√
1 + [(2/p) c+ 1]− 1
[(2/p) c+ 1]
. (15)
16This formulation assumes that the union wage represents the opportunity cost to those
who could become entrepreneurs.
17Some econometric support is available for our proposition. Using OECD country
data in 1978-93, Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001) find a negative relationship between
entrepreneurship and union density. In Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) using extended
OECD data set for 1978-98, the union effect is measured by several variables. All those
variables obtain negative coefficients as predicted by their model. Taken together, this
evidence indicates that union power reduces the entry of new enterprises, as suggested by
our model.
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A simple numerical example demonstrates. Take that p = c = 1. Then,
v = 1
3
and w = 1
3
. Make the union wage marginally higher, say w = 1.1
3
.Then
solving for the entrepreneurship in the unionized economy gives vu = 0.13 <
1
3
.
4 Tacit Knowledge and Enterprise Turnover:
An Overlapping Generations Approach
We now introduce formally the idea that entrepreneurs (and workers) live
two periods. The first period is spent as a worker or as an entrepreneur
and the second period as a retiree. A firm can be established as a start-up
by a new entrepreneur or it can be bought from a retiring entrepreneur. In
the previous sections, we assumed that each firm is active for one period
and then is terminated. Now we introduce an assumption that enterprises
can be traded at the end of the life-cycle of the retiring entrepreneurs. The
benefit of the option of buying an enterprise is strengthened by the possibility
of acquiring at the same time valuable tacit knowledge from the retiring
entrepreneur who in turn acquired his knowledge during his business life.
The tacit knowledge is imbedded in an entrepreneur. Therefore, its quality
cannot be observed nor contracted upon.
In our model, there is no physical capital. The firm’s market value thus
completely reflects the perceived tacit knowledge to be traded. Access to such
knowledge would enhance the profitability of the enterprise for the new en-
trepreneur. The new entrepreneur, however, faces an informational problem:
he cannot judge ex ante the value of the advice delivered. The informational
asymmetry may create a discontinuity in transition of entrepreneurial knowl-
edge from one generation of entrepreneurs to the next one and gives rise to
some challenging policy issues.18
In each period t, there are retiring entrepreneurs from period t − 1 and
the new ones. They stand willing to help and advise the new entrepreneur
providing him with their tacit knowledge. There are several issues. How is
the tacit knowledge priced? In which way is it transmitted?
We assume that the value of knowledge is related to the entrepreneurial
18There is a further informational barrier in the market for firms: how to locate the
retiring entrepreneurs and match them with potential new entrepreneurs? This issue can
be addressed by a search model though we do not take it up in this paper.
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ability of the retiring entrepreneur. Those who turned out to face a low entry
cost are good candidates of providing high-quality advice while those with a
larger entry cost can provide an advice of lower quality. The abilities of the
new entrepreneurs to absorb the knowledge are not differentiated, only their
entrepreneurial skill reflected in the entry cost is.
The true quality of advice, q, can then be modeled as
qi = c− ci. (16)
We use µi to denote the price of the advice. With perfect information,
µi = qi. (17)
The informational asymmetry concerns the unobservability of quality q. As
the start-up cost ci is unobservable, the entrepreneurs’ income statement
does not provide information on the entrepreneurial ability. This is the in-
formation barrier we analyze below. We take it for granted that the retiring
entrepreneur wants to cash in on his business. Tacit knowledge can be trans-
mitted, however, only through a costly training effort. The time allocated
by the retiring entrepreneur has its opportunity cost. We denote the cost of
the training effort of the retiring entrepreneur by C > 0.19
Moreover, frictions in the market for firms can also arise from that the
retiring entrepreneurs tend to attach emotional value to their business. It is
not clear ex ante whether this would result in underpricing or overpricing.
The retiring ones, having incurred the entry cost and spent their active life as
nurturing their enterprise and business idea like their own baby, are keen to
see that its life will continue. This points to the possibility of underpricing.
However, with emotional attachment to their enterprise they also tend to
overvalue it. In the model to be outlined here, we abstract from the emotional
value.
4.1 Equilibrium with Perfect and Symmetric Informa-
tion
It is easier first to consider the hypothetical case where the quality of advice
is known to both parties. In this section, we therefore assume that the real-
izations of the tacit knowledge are observable and common knowledge. The
19Costly effort suggests that there also may be a moral hazard problem if the new
entrepreneur is uncertain whether the retiring one really has commited to full effort. We
do not explore this distortion in detail here.
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market for enterprises is well-functioning and the tacit knowledge is traded
at its true value. Acquiring the tacit knowledge is reflected in reduced entry
cost by the entering entrepreneur. His net benefit from the tacit knowledge
is zero during the start-up stage. At the end of his life-cycle, he can, how-
ever, cash the knowledge he has acquired during his life-time. The tacit
knowledge will thus be transferred to the next generation at the right price.
The equilibrium is characterized by a distribution of consulting prices which
fully reflect the quality of the advice. We suggest that access to tacit knowl-
edge reduces the entrepreneurial threshold in an economy with perfect and
symmetric information:
Lemma 1. Subject to the condition that the training cost is not too large, the
entry threshold is lower in an economy where tacit knowledge is transmitted
in comparison with an economy where it is not. There are more firms. As to
the incidence, as wages are higher part of the welfare effect of tacit knowledge
is transferred to workers.
Proof. Let j denote the retiring entrepreneur and i the new entrepreneur.
For a formal proof, we write the entry condition of individual i
πit = −c
i + (qj − µj) + pl − wl −
1
2
wl2 +max
(
0,
µi − C
1 + r
)
≥ w, (18)
with equality sign for the marginal entrepreneur. Note that by (17), the net
benefit from acquiring tacit knowledge is zero, qj −µj = 0.We have denoted
r = the discount rate. The result follows provided that the condition
µi − C
1 + r
> 0
holds. This is the condition for the retiring entrepreneur to be active in
trading his knowledge to the successor. Finally, increased labor demand
raises the market wage and the incidence result is obtained.20
4.2 Asymmetric Quality Information
The problem which we now consider arises when the new entrepreneurs can-
not verify the quality of the advise, q.We suggest that the new entrepreneurs
20Note that it is not the case that the current generation would be able to cash in on
all future generations as those have the option of establishing a start-up firm instead of
buying one.
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face a distribution of qualities of tacit entrepreneurial knowledge. The new
ones are unable to identify the quality of the tacit knowledge. Their willing-
ness to pay for the knowledge has to be based on the average quality of the
knowledge, q.21
We now suggest that under informational asymmetry, there can be more
new firms or there can be fewer new firms than under perfect information.
Which case is obtained depends on whether q−C
1+r
is positive or negative. Write
the entry condition of the marginal entrepreneur as
πmt = −c
m + pl − wl −
1
2
wl2 +max
(
0,
q − C
1 + r
)
≥ w.
If q−C
1+r
> 0, the low-quality entrepreneurs are able to charge more than
is the true value of their tacit knowledge which they generate during their
career, q > qm. There will be more entrepreneurs than under symmetric in-
formation. On the other hand if q−C
1+r
< 0, no new entrepreneurial generation
expects to be able to cash in on its tacit knowledge. There will be fewer
entrepreneurs than under symmetric information.
Lemma 2. With asymmetric information of the true value of tacit knowl-
edge, there can be more or fewer entrepreneurs than under symmetric infor-
mation.
4.3 Quality of Advice and Entrepreneurial Spirit
At the beginning of this paper, we referred to empirical work which suggested
that the entry costs differ substantially across countries. An economy with
low entry cost and strong tradition in entrepreneurship in the past can be
expected to have strong entrepreneurial spirit in the future. The nature of
overlapping generations of entrepreneurs provides the link in this mechanism.
In an economy where the marginal entrepreneur expects to benefit from the
advice and tacit knowledge of the retiring entrepreneur the entry rate tends
to be higher than in an economy where it is the opposite case. We can
introduce this vision by adjusting the quality of advice as
qi(λ) = c− λci, λ > 0.
21The issue is analogous to the considered by DeMeza and Webb in their model of a
bank. Akerlof’s (1970) adverse selection model does not strictly apply here because the
tacit knowledge has no alternative use.
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The retiring entrepreneurs in economies with a low value of λ are able
to provide higher quality advice to the start-up entrepreneurs than in those
with a higher value. In the latter economy, a start-up entrepreneur buying
an old firm has expected profit
πit = −c
i + (c− λcj − qj(λ)) + pl − wl −
1
2
wl2 +
qi(λ)− C
1 + r
, (19)
and expects to be able to have a lower return on his consulting services than
in an economy with higher λ. In an equilibrium where the tacit knowledge
cannot be trusted to be valuable also workers suffer as wages are lower.
How should the government step in to eliminate the distortion? To cre-
ate an economy with strong entrepreneurial spirit, the government should
not only economize on entry regulation but support the creation of social
capital and trust to make the transmission easier. The view emerging from
our analysis points to the independent role of entrepreneurial spirit as a psy-
chological factor in addition and above to its economic role.
4.4 From the Parent to the Child: Regression toward
the Mean
In our analysis above, entrepreneurship was determined by self-selection with
those having a low entry cost choosing entrepreneurship. The rest of the
population entered the labor market. Without transmission of tacit knowl-
edge, the resulting equilibrium repeats itself. Above we considered the case
where some of the abilities useful in entrepreneurship can be transferred like
a meme. In the new equilibrium, there were more entrepreneurs if such a
knowledge transfer was not hampered by informational restrictions. As a
result of the intergenerational transfer of tacit knowledge, the quality of the
marginal entrepreneur was lower in the new equilibrium which also repeats
itself.
We next consider the transmission of entrepreneurial skill within a dy-
nasty. This issue is highly relevant as the ability of children to run the empire
created by their parents has repeatedly been questioned. It is useful to make
two points at the start. First and given stationarity conditions, the distri-
bution of entrepreneurial ability of children of entrepreneurs is the same as
the distribution of those skills in the whole population. However, the mean
entrepreneurial ability of children must be less than the mean ability of their
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parents as entrepreneurs. This conclusion follows from regression toward the
mean effect identified long ago by Galton (1886).22 Second, each parent has
an informational advantage over the quality of the child when compared to
outsiders. Before we consider the potential equilibria, we have to take a
notice of this informational asymmetry.
4.5 Winner’s Curse in the Lemon’s Market
From the social point of view, it is important that the right people perform
the right tasks in the society. The empirical results by Perez-Gonzales (2006)
on the effects of inherited control on firms’ performance should be brought
in here. He reports that firms where incoming CEOs are related to the
departing CEO, to a founder, or to a large shareholder by either blood or
marriage underperform in terms of operating profitability and market-to-
book ratios, relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs. Consistent with
wasteful nepotism, lower performance is prominent in firms that appoint
family CEOs. In the light of those results, the parent should consider the
outside offers especially if he thinks that the child is incapable.23 We consider
two cases.
A competent parent A competent parent having the bequest motive
transfers his firm and his tacit knowledge to the child if the child is capable.
The problem of informational inefficiency is eliminated and the child’s en-
try cost is reduced. There is, of course, the possibility that the child might
make a better living, say as rock singer than as an entrepreneur, in which
case he rationally refuses to continue his parent’s project. The intra-dynasty
transfer of tacit knowledge leads to social benefits if the transfer is more ef-
ficient within families when compared with a transfer through markets. The
social optimality of the transmission within the dynasty, however, is condi-
tional upon that no outside candidate with superior entrepreneurial quality
22It is an artifact of choosing a non-representative sample in one variable (parent having
passed the demanding market test as entrepreneurs) and then examining another variable
(children). See also the next reference below. What matters on average should not make
one overlook the other possibility that a child might be more competent as an entrepreneur
than the parent. The reason why this is less common in a large sample is the regression
toward the mean effect. The successful entrepreneurs have passed the selection process.
23If the parent has several children, he may induce them to compete for their access to
his enterprise.
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is blocked away. Moreover, although the child is less competent than an out-
sider candidate, the parent may transfer the firm to the child when the lemon
problem results in a low market price. This is a socially costly outcome and
arises when the market for firms is a lemon market.
If the bequest motive makes the parent hand the business over to his child
though a better outside candidate would be available, a distortion arises and
results in a welfare loss. In this case, the implication is that the transfer of
business within the dynasty should be taxed. There is more to it as there
are informational issues to which we now turn to.
A less competent parent Consider the case where the parent is less
competent, say close the individual identified as the marginal entrepreneur.
In his case, his advise to his child is of low quality and a more competent child
would do better by buying another firm from the market. If the outsider is
informed that the parent has a child but that the business is not transferred
to the child, he rationally expects that the firm is of a low-quality type.24
The Mayers-Majluf (1984) undervaluation problem arises: the insiders know
more than the outsiders. The retiring entrepreneur wants to sell at an inflated
price but the rational buyers want to discount in order to avoid the winner’s
curse.
Distortions In terms of the efficiency criterion, we face a trade-off between
two bad equilibria. There is one, where the entry cost is avoided and the
tacit knowledge transferred but an incompetent child takes up the leadership.
There is another one where the entry cost is not avoided and where the tacit
knowledge may not be transferred. In the latter case, we are back in the
problem that the outside candidate cannot judge for sure the true value of
the firm.
Only low-quality enterprises - lemons - tend to be traded and the high-
quality ones are handed over to the children. An adverse selection problem
arises. There is more to it: the parent’s bequest motive may make the
outcome even worse. We report
Proposition 3 When those who are outsiders to the dynasty know that the
retiring entrepreneur has a child, the market value of tacit knowledge is lower
24The case may be even more complicated as is a further possibility: the outsider may
be informed that the child is making a profitable career as a rock singer and concludes
that the firm is not a lemon.
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when compared with the case where the parent has no child. There is distorted
allocation of entrepreneurial talent. The low-quality firms are always brought
for sale but so are the high-quality ones if the competence of the child is
sufficiently low relative to the competence of the parent.
The efficiency of business turnover thus depends in an interesting way on
the demographic structures of families. Access to a transfer within a dynasty
may result in efficiency gains but may also hamper efficient transfers through
the market. The prediction of our theory is that the market for enterprises
is a lemons’ market: high-quality firms are rarely sold to outsiders.
5 Discussion
The entry cost operates like a tax on new entrepreneurs. One can, how-
ever, argue that if it is a real social cost it should not be socialized. There
is a potential counter-argument: not often but sometimes new innovations
and entrepreneurs lead to unpredicted social benefits, say astronomical so-
cial returns. Just think in terms of innovative entrepreneurial superstars like
Thomas Edison, Chester Carlson, Walt Disney, Steve Jobs or Bill Gates. In-
novations with such extraordinary social returns also arise from innovations
within companies. One can think of the social returns created by companies
like Nokia and other mobile phone producers making the life so much easier
for millions of people. Intrapreneurship cannot, however, fully replace entre-
preneurship as those represent complementary avenues for human creativity.
Given the hypothesis of complementarity and the possibility of positive social
externalities unrecognized by the innovators, the De Meza-Webb tax could
be rather harmful.
Part of the entry cost is caused by the excessive government regulation.
The regulation itself may be needed and desirable but over-regulation creates
a substantial social cost by hampering entry of new firms. As to the labor
markets, while one can think that the Boadway-Keen model - implicitly -
captures the union effect in terms of their return variable (unions reduce
the return on entrepreneurship), the model does not capture the negative
externality of a monopoly union in terms of misallocation of people in var-
ious tasks in the society. Our view suggested in the current paper that the
tacit knowledge is inefficiently transferred between consecutive generations
because of informational asymmetries raises further issues. Tacit knowledge
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tends to be mis-priced. This is the case when the child in a dynasty is incom-
petent or when the outsiders consider the market for enterprises as a lemon’s
market. One can ask whether the De Meza - Webb tax would make things
worse.
A further distortion tends to arise from the introduction of new products
- which is what start-up entrepreneurs often are doing. When new products
are experience goods and when the consumers are less convinced of their
quality, adverse selection may take place as predicted by Akerlof (1970).
Some high-quality products may not find their markets. To introduce the
De Meza - Webb tax would limit entrepreneurship instead of correcting the
allocation.
An income tax tends to create an entry barrier as the (unobservable)
entry cost cannot qualify as a deduction in the tax base. One should also
point out that a counter-mechanism is created by the possibility of successful
entrepreneurs under-reporting their income and consuming private benefits
in the firm. Aiming at a neutral tax treatment would require considering
the total tax rate both on entrepreneurship and on its opportunity cost, the
labor income. Such an analysis is still missing from public finance. We sug-
gest that many taxes (including the cash flow tax, the dividend tax and the
ACE tax) understood to be neutral with respect to the marginal investment
choices of firms cannot be neutral when it comes to think about the entry of
new firms (Kanniainen and Panteghini (2007)). Finally, the work on indus-
trial organization area suggests that market entry is affected by the strategic
behavior of the incumbent firms (Boadway and Trembley (2005)) and can
result in additional sources of entry barriers.
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